


History



Transition Pack



Why history?

Edexcel:

Nationalism, dictatorship and democracy in the 20th century Europe

Poverty, public health and the state in Britain c1780-1939

We have chosen a modern world history course that examines political, economic and social issues.

Year 12

Year 13

<u>Paper One:</u>	<u>Paper Two:</u>	<u>Paper Three:</u>	<u>Coursework:</u>
<i>Germany and West Germany, 1918–89</i>	<i>The rise and fall of fascism in Italy, c1911–46</i>	<i>Poverty, public health and the state in Britain c1780-1939</i>	<i>The Cold War</i>
30% A level	20% A level	30% A level	20% A level
2 hours 15 minutes	1 hour 30 minutes	2 hours 15 minutes	3000 -4000 words

Assessment:


- Internal mock exams on papers 1 and 2 sat at the end of Year 12
- Three exams which are sat at the end of Year 13
- Independent coursework essay – research for this begins towards the end of Year 12 and the piece is submitted in Year 13

Entry Requirements:


We require you to have good grades in both History and English Literature (History-*desirable* at GCSE level Grade 6). You must enjoy reading and have the ability to work independently. It is important that you are able to write focused answers and enjoy class discussions. A passion for history is also a must!

Course materials for A level History


In year 12 we primarily work from the textbook below. Alongside are supporting revision guides for both the Germany and Italy units.



ISBN: 9781447985303



ISBN: 9781471876493



ISBN: 9781471876523

As an A level History student it is hugely important that you are organised in your approach to both classwork and homework. History can easily become a jumble of notes, dates and reading materials. Regular folder checks take place to ensure you are keeping on top of this.

Materials:

- Separate lever-arch folders for the units
- File dividers to separate the different topics/themes
- Plastic wallets to keep work neat and help 'file' things away
- Lined paper
- Stationery – pen, pencil, highlighters etc.
- History textbook – it is your responsibility to take care of this. Damaged or lost school copies will be replaced by you. Some students choose to purchase their own copies of the textbook.

If you are having difficulty with any of the tasks, please feel free to contact:

Mrs Goodwin-Duff: jo.goodwin@bushfield.co.uk

Miss Thomson: zoe.thomson@bushfield.co.uk

Mrs Armstrong: catherine.armstrong@bushfield.co.uk

Mr Brown: daniel.brown@bushfield.co.uk

A level history preparatory tasks

To assist with the transition from GCSE history to A level history, we require you to complete some background research into the periods that you will be studying. This research will be the focus for your first history lessons and will combine the two Nationalism units you study in Year 12; Germany and West Germany 1918-1939 and The rise and fall of fascism in Italy, c1911-46.

Please complete all the tasks and bring your answers, research and any other further reading to your first lesson in September.

Careful Reading Task:

It will come as no surprise that A level History involves a lot of reading and builds on the essay writing skills of Year 11. Being able to understand a variety of articles and break down their content and meaning are some of the key skills you will develop on the course, skills that you will then put to use in the source analysis tasks on each exam paper.

The following steps can be applied to any reading-based activity:

- 1) Read the whole article twice, ensuring you look at any images and their captions, diagrams, footnotes, sub-headings.
- 2) Some words, phrases or terms you don't understand? Look them up in a dictionary or on the internet. Ask your teacher.
- 3) Underline the main points of the article in pencil. Try to be concise with this – if most of the text is underlined go through and edit. Try to think, *if you only had 1 minute to explain this article to someone, what details would you include?*
- 4) Now summarise in the style that suits you best – mindmap, small paragraph, bullet points?

Now apply each of these points to the article on the next page. Ensure you complete your summary.

From 'divine Caesar' to Hitler's lapdog – the rise and fall of Benito Mussolini

***Il Duce* was always the weaker partner in Nazi-Fascist Pact of Steel, and as the war progressed became increasingly reliant on Germany**

The Spectator magazine 2nd May 2020: Book review of **Mussolini's War: Fascist Italy from Triumph to Collapse, 1935-1943**, John Gooch, Penguin £30



Hitler and Mussolini in Berlin in 1941

In 1919, an obscure political agitator called Benito Mussolini assembled a ragbag of Blackshirt diehards in the Lombard capital of Milan and launched the movement that was to become, two years later, the National Fascist Party. The party took its name from the classical Roman symbol of authority — an axe bound in rods, or *fascēs*. Once in power, Mussolini introduced the stiff-armed Roman salute after the handshake was considered fey and unhygienic. At times he wore a richly tasselled fez and thrust out his chin pugnaciously for the cameras.

For all his posturing and demagoguery, Mussolini was widely admired in pre-war Britain, where Lord Rothermere's *Daily Mail* routinely carried flattering portraits of him. He was on amicable terms with King George V, moreover, who in 1923 publicly congratulated the dictator on his 'wise leadership'. Mussolini was seen by many British politicians as a potential ally against Hitler's Germany. To anyone disgruntled at all by parliamentary democracy, leftist poets, Jazz Age flappers and imagined Judeo-Bolshevik threats, fascism offered a 'virile' political alternative.

As the cult of *ducismo* strengthened, the high priests of fascism hailed Mussolini as a 'divine Caesar' figure, and adopted the *passo romano*, the Latin goosestep, for military parades. A mood of jingoist triumphalism swept Italy after Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in 1935 and incorporated Haile Selassie's vanquished kingdom into a vast new East African empire, along with Eritrea and Somaliland.

With his rapid African conquests, Mussolini won the hypnotised consent of the majority. To his legion of female admirers he radiated a manful potency and near-animal allure. He had relations with literally hundreds of women, perhaps 'as many as 400' according to one Italian historian. They were brusquely mauled by him under a large ministerial desk or on mattress-like cushions installed for the purpose.

Sex lay at the heart of the fascist cult of physical daring or *ardimento*. ('My great lord and beautiful Duce,' a Bologna housewife, typically, wrote to Mussolini. 'I have done nothing but trouble you' — she had sent him a total of 848 letters.) Towards the end of his 23-year dictatorship, facing defeat, Mussolini became addicted to a German-synthesised aphrodisiac pill trademarked Hormovin. Popping this prototype Viagra was in some ways a political act, that served to prolong the myth of the supremo who never flagged.

Beneath the vainglorious sexual antics and balcony ranting was a man who earnestly dreamed of a second Roman empire for Italy, and dominion over all the Mediterranean. How this pontiff-like Caesar-divinity brought Italy to such a state of ruination yet bedazzled so much of Europe is the subject of this impressive new history, *Mussolini's War*.

John Gooch, a Leeds University professor, views Mussolini as deep down a solitary figure, who 'never believed in experts unless they agreed with him'. Alone and aloof at the head of fascist government, he surrounded himself with reliably complaisant functionaries, who displayed a dog-like obedience and devotion to his warmongering aims.

Unfortunately for Italy, fascist war policy was never linked to a coherent national strategy, argues Gooch. Mussolini relied at first on cosh gangs to instil fear in his opponents at home; then came the concentration camps and, in 1938, fascist anti-Semitic legislation which turned Italian Jews overnight into social pariahs. Though Mussolini forbade his daughter to marry a Jew, one of his many mistresses, Margherita Sarfatti, was Jewish. The eagle motifs and suckling she-wolves visible today on fascist-era architecture in Italy are partly Sarfatti's legacy, as she was the mastermind behind fascism's pompous celebration of ancient Rome. Sarfatti's best selling 1926 biography, *Dux*, exalted Mussolini as a quasi-sacred manifestation of *romanità* ('Romanness') and the martial Italian race. Yet her name was dirt once Mussolini had hitched his carnival chariot to Hitler's funeral hearse and, as Gooch writes, committed Italy to Nazi Germany's 'anti-Semitic cause'.

Most historians agree that Mussolini greeted Hitler's rise to power in 1933 with suspicion. A racial dogma that glorified blond northern Europeans conflicted somewhat with the Mediterranean cult of *romanità*. To many Italians, Hitler looked unappealingly furtive and rat-like beside their grandly uniformed Dux. But Mussolini's decision to intervene in the Spanish Civil War in 1938 lethally allied him to the Führer, as it put him on Germany's side in the anti-communist 'crusade' waged by General Franco.

Mussolini was indisputably the weaker partner in the Nazi-fascist Pact of Steel signed in 1939; yet he resented the imputation that Italian anti-Semitism was the price of friendship with Germany. A latent tension had always existed in Italy between fascism and Italian Jewry. Zionists, in particular, were resented by Mussolini as a self-regarding, supranational sect, inimical to the sturdy Blackshirt bond of race and nation. In 1939, while addressing a fascist

convention in Bologna, he lambasted Jews as 'miserable deadweights'; from there it was a short step to eliminating them.

As the war progressed Mussolini became, disastrously, 'ever more in hock to Nazi Germany', writes Gooch. Axis allies, such as King Boris III of Bulgaria (who was King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy's son-in-law), cravenly participated in Hitler's assault on Greece and Yugoslavia. The Duce's ill-advised invasion of Greece in October 1940, however, ended in humiliation when the Italians withdrew in a disorderly rout across the Epirus mountains. In North Africa the dictator fared even more disastrously. In a mighty blow to Italian morale, he was trounced at Tobruk in January 1941 by Britain's Desert Army.

In Gooch's lucid analysis, Mussolini clung stubbornly to the belief that war would toughen and invigorate the Italian people. In the summer of 1941, accordingly, with the Vatican's blessing, he sent 230,000 Italian troops to Russia after Hitler had attacked his unsuspecting ally Joseph Stalin. The Eastern Front proved a severe trauma for the Italian soldiers. Stranded without leadership in sub-zero temperatures, an estimated 43,580 men died during the chaotic retreat of January 1943 and were left unburied on the steppe's frozen immensity. Among the Italian officers who managed to return was Nuto Revelli, whose 1946 account of the Russia debacle, *Mai Tardi (Never Again)*, Gooch clearly admires. His face disfigured by frostbite, Revelli scorned fascist generals who even at the war's end spoke of the nobility of the Blackshirt cause. His book is a classic to rank with *All Quiet on the Western Front*.

Gooch ends his ever more woeful account on 8 September 1943, when Field Marshal Badoglio announced an Armistice with the Allies, and Mussolini's days apparently were numbered. Fascist party headquarters were set ablaze and the *fasces* insignia machine-gunned from the front of buildings. Angry crowds in some cities prevented firemen from reaching the cathartic pyre. The worst fascist offenders went into hiding; it was their turn now to be hunted. While the Allies hurried to send in troops to occupy Italy, they were not fast enough. Hitler having swiftly commanded key points in the north, Italy was effectively left cut in two: south of Naples, under the Americans and the British; north of Naples, under the Germans. On 12 September, Mussolini was rescued from his jail in the Apeninnes by a team of crack German parachutists and hurriedly installed as head of Italy's new Nazi-fascist republic. A ruthless new 'Italian' government was set up at Salò on the shores of Lake Garda, with the Duce as the Führer's increasingly unhappy lapdog. Italians had not been liberated from the Nazi-fascist war machine after all.

Mussolini's War, diligently researched if at times indifferently written ('Starace was privileging loyalty, whereas Bocchini was prioritising reality'), offers an exceptionally detailed portrait of the Duce as warmonger. Gooch is among the first historians outside Italy to consider fascism solely through the lens of Mussolini's prolonged and unwinnable war. It may be fashionable these days to claim Mussolini as a fundamentally decent fellow, led astray by Hitler. Understandably most Italians wish to view themselves as *brava gente* — good people — so they prefer to blame Hitler both for Mussolini's murderous anti-Semitism and the calamitous Russia campaign.

Gooch, though, is not so indulgent. Thousands of Italians had lost their lives to one man's titanic martial ambitions. Vengeance, when it came, was squalid. On 28 April 1945, 75 years ago last month, Benito Mussolini was executed by Italian partisans and strung up by his feet for all to see in a square in Milan. The tinpot Caesar was no more.

By Ian Thomson

Now answer the following questions about the article:

- 1) How was Mussolini viewed by Britain?
- 2) The article compares Mussolini to Caesar – who was he and why are links made between the two?
- 3) Was Mussolini popular? Provide evidence from the article.
- 4) What sort of strategies did Mussolini implement to take control?
- 5) Why was Mussolini originally suspicious of Hitler?
- 6) What brought Italy and Germany closer together?
- 7) What was the Pact of Steel?
- 8) What was Mussolini's motive(s) for invading Russia during WWII?
- 9) What is surprising about the date that Italy reached an armistice with the Allies in WWII?
- 1) Did the armistice signal the end for Mussolini? Explain your response.

Now you have answered the questions, look again at the summary/diagram you created earlier. Is there anything you would now add or take away from your original work?

Historical skills task

Having excellent subject knowledge is only half of the story when it comes to your history A level. You must have an understanding of the way different historical themes work with and against one other and be able to communicate this concisely in your written work.

There are many different types of history which a historian may choose to specialise in. Often these fall into ‘themes’ so are referred to as thematic histories where a historian focuses on a particular aspect of change.

Eg. An economic history of the British Empire would focus on trade and the economic reasons for the expansion of the empire, whereas political history of the empire would focus on strategic/legislative reasons for expansion and how the colonies were governed.

Some of the main ones you will come across in your A level course are:

- **Political history**
- **Economic history**
- **Religious history**
- **Military history**
- **Social history**
- **International history**

Task: Write a definition for each type of history listed.

If you can, provide a historical example to support your definition and show how studying history has many opportunities for investigation, as I have shown in the example above.

Tasks one and two: Italy

Write the definition of these keywords on lined paper. Make sure that you write a definition that makes sense to you. Don't just copy out something that you find on the internet as perhaps this may confuse you. Look for a suitable short and concise definition that you **fully understand**. Use some of the useful websites we have mentioned at the end of this transition pack.

POLITICAL TERMS	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL
Liberalism	Inflation	propaganda
Communism	Tariffs	elite
Socialism	Laissez-faire	petty-bourgeoisie
Fascism	deflation	clergy
Nationalism	import	bourgeoisie
Dictatorship/dictator	export	censorship
Totalitarianism	autarky	repression
Ideologies	rentier	
Right-Wing Ideology	syndicate	
Left-Wing Ideology	agrari	
Decree	Great depression	
Suffrage	capitalism	
moderate view		
radical view		
anarchism		
authoritarian		




Task three: Research Italian history 1911-46

Find out the date that each event occurred. **Make a timeline** of these events on lined paper. Useful link: [click on the link from the BBC](#) or go to <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17435616>

- First World War begins, Italy declares its neutrality.
- Italy entered the First World War.
- Battle of Caporetto and Battle of Vittorio Veneto.
- Treaty of Versailles.
- Mussolini appointed PM.
- The Acerbo Law
- The Matteotti Crisis
- Mussolini announces to Italian parliament that he will be enforcing a fascist dictatorship.
- When Italy invaded Abyssinia (where is this?)
- Italy joined the Second World War with Nazi Germany.
- Mussolini was removed from power by Fascist Grand Council and arrested on orders of the King.
- Italy declares war on Germany
- Mussolini's execution.

Task four: Italy - Giovanni Giolitti

At the very start of our Italian unit we look at an individual called Giovanni Giolitti. In fact there is a block of work we do based on his success and failures from **1911-1914**. Use this website to **briefly** write information about **who he was** and what his **role** was in Italy. Click on the link [useful starting point for Giolitti](#) or go to www.spartacus-educational.com/FWWgiolitti.htm. We only need to look at his major actions from 1911 onwards.



Tasks five and six: Germany Research the meanings of the following words/phrases. For those highlighted in red, find out the date they occurred and create a visual timeline. Find all dates before beginning your timeline.

Weimar Germany 1919-1933	Nazi Germany 1933-45	Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 1945-89
Theme: Political and governmental change		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Kaiser Wilhelm ● Reich ● Armistice ● November Criminals ● Reichstag ● Bundesrat ● Coalition ● Treaty of Versailles ● Weimar government ● Spartacist Revolt ● Freikorps ● Article 48 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Reichstag Fire ● Hitler becomes Chancellor ● Enabling Act ● Night of the Long Knives ● SA and SS ● Volksgemeinschaft ● Führerprinzip ● Lebensraum ● Germany invades Poland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Potsdam Conference ● Marshall Plan ● Cold War ● The Basic Law ● Konrad Adenauer ● Hallstein Doctrine (1955) ● Free market economy ● Ostpolitik ● The Berlin Wall is built ● Berlin Wall dismantled ● German unification
Theme: Opposition, Control and Consent		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Friedrich Ebert ● Right-wing opposition ● Left-wing opposition ● Ebert-Groener Pact ● Kapp Putsch ● Munich Putsch ● Mein Kampf ● Gustav Stresemann 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Führer myth ● Hitler Youth ● Edelweiss Pirates ● White Rose Group ● ‘Undesirables’ ● Concordat ● People’s Church ● Martin Niemöller ● Censorship ● Propaganda ● People’s Court 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Year zero ● NATO ● APO ● Vietnam War ● SDS ● West Berlin Tupamaros ● Baader-Meinhof ● BfV and BND ● Nuremberg trials ● De-Nazification

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Theme 3: Economic development and policies

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Inflation ● Black market ● Social welfare ● Reparations ● The Ruhr ● Hyperinflation ● Reichsmark ● Dawes Plan ● Young Plan ● Cartel ● Isolationism ● League of Nations ● Wall Street Crash ● Real wages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Autarky ● Reich Labour Service (RAD) ● Four Year Plan ● German Labour Front (DAF) ● Reich Entailed Farm Law ● Command economy ● T4 programme ● Strength through Joy ● Winter Aid ● Blitzkrieg 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● USSR ● Deutschmark ● GDR ● Social market economy ● Co-determination ● The economic miracle ● Korean War ● Refugees ● Oil crisis ● Baby boomers ● European Economic Community (EEC) ● Treaty of Rome
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Aspects of life in Germany and West Germany

(1) Women

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Kinder, Küche, Kirche ● German Civil Code, 1900 ● Article 109 ● New women 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Eugenics ● Aryanism ● Bund Deutscher Mädel (BDM) ● Lebensborn Programme ● Mother's Cross 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Surplus women ● Women's liberation ● Paragraph 218
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(2) Education and culture

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Confessional school ● Simultaneous school ● Secular school ● Bauhaus 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● NSLB ● Curriculum ● Stereotype ● Gleichschaltung ● Reichskulturkammer ● Degenerate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Länder ● De-Nazification of schools ● Consumerism ● Americanisation
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(3) Ethnic minorities

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Anti-Semitism ● Gypsies ● Germany's shame 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Kristallnacht ● Holocaust ● Final Solution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Expellees ● White-collar job ● Guest workers ● Assimilation
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Tasks seven: Germany: The Weimar Constitution

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6JAqg6TPk>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fESH_9DGT



Watch the two links above – they explain how the German system of government (the Weimar constitution worked). After WWI and the abdication of the Kaiser, Germany became a republic so the government system was adapted to reflect this.

Using the videos to help, create a diagram which shows how the Weimar Constitution operated. This should reflect the order of power/responsibility in the government system as well as an explanation about what each part of the constitution meant. To help, your diagram should include:

- The President
- The Chancellor
- The Reichstag
- The Reichsrat
- The Cabinet
- The Länder
- The German people (electorate)
- Article 48

You may choose to add other details too. Don't worry if it's not 100% accurate, this will be one of the first things we look at in September.

Research:

What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Weimar Republic?

This website will be a useful starting point:

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zcsvp39/revision/1>

Tasks eight and nine: So you think you're a good dictator?

Two key individuals you will study on your A level course are the dictators Adolf Hitler, leader of Germany 1933-45 (Paper 1) and Benito Mussolini, dictator of Italy 1922-43 (Paper 2).

Compile CVs for Hitler and Mussolini

Numbers 1 -3 must be on your CV, then choose at least 2 other categories to include.

1. Personal Information: name, address, birth date, strong points in personality and character, etc.
2. Professional Experience: Employment history, employers names, locations, years of employment, job descriptions (beginning with the most recent)
3. Educational Background: School names and years attended (beginning with most recent date), degrees held, major/minor areas of study
4. Military Service: type of military experience, training, number of years in service
5. Hobbies and Interests: Things your person enjoys doing out of work – such as: activities, hobbies, special talents, skills, etc.
6. Accomplishments: special successes that your person would be proud of and would make him/her more employable (be specific)
7. Awards and Honours: awards and honours received for achievement – scholastic, athletic, humanitarian, military
8. References: people who know your abilities and would offer positive comments about you as a person or professional. Who would have liked them?



Task 10: Historical skills – source analysis

There is a big leap from the source analysis you are familiar with from GCSE. At A level there are no picture sources in the exam although you will still be asked to compare two written sources. Usually this will be related to a particular theme, for example, Hitler's foreign policy as a cause for the start of WWII.

Source Analysis checklist

Who? If the source doesn't tell you directly look at the supporting caption. Is the source a firsthand account? Is the author a leader, a politician, a journalist, a civilian, a government advisor? Is it an extract from a speech or news report? The writer of a source is key as it can provide many clues about the perspective from which it is written. It can also limit a source's usefulness – an anti-Nazi pamphlet for example is unlikely to include much information which celebrates the success of Hitler's economic policy.

What? What is being said? What does the source actually tell you? **What** could also be used to look at the **type** of source it is – different types of sources can provide different levels of usefulness and/or bias. Diaries or letters due to their personal nature might be more revealing. A newspaper report might be highly censored so limited in what it is allowed to say.

When? Is the date significant? What happened then? Does this limit the source? Why/How? Being able to draw upon your own knowledge helps with this. For example an interview with an Italian civilian at the start of Mussolini's reign as Prime Minister might be very different from one nearer the end of his rule during WWII.

Where? Where is the author? A British newspaper criticising the Nazi regime would be different from a German newspaper trying to do the same. An Italian worker in Milan (northern Italy) would have a different experience of working compared to one in Sicily (southern Italy).

Tone/language? Is it positive? What adjectives are used to describe the content of the source? Does the author use inclusive language for example 'we' or stick to 'I' What might this suggest? Does it seem as if the author is being reserved in their comments?

Context – What was going on at the time the source was written? How could that reflect what the source itself is saying?

Comparison - With two or more sources you will need to compare the content. Are there similarities? Differences? Why might this be?

As you now know Italy joined WW1 and was on the winning side. However her involvement in the war created many problems both during and post war. Read these assessments of the impact of the war.

- 1) As you read, **use two colours** to colour code the **positive** and **negative** impacts of the war for Italy. Read the historians' views twice through,
- 2) **Circle** any words you find tricky e.g. 'conscript' and look up the definition separately.
- 3) Read the sources again, this time writing **E= for economic**, **S= for social** and **P=political** in the margin to show the problems/ positives in these different categories.

Economic - things to do with money

Social - things to do with communication and groups in society/people

Political - things to do with the government and leadership.

Source 1: P. Morgan, Italian Fascism 1919-45 (1995) p.7

Italy's involvement in the First World War was the first great collective and national experience for literally millions of Italians, especially the largely peasant conscript army. But, partly because of the imperfect nation forming since its unification, and partly because of the way Italy entered the war in 1915 and the way the war was conducted. The Great war did not bring about national integration and unity. There was notemporary national and political truce for the duration of the war between rich and poor. Italy's wartime experience was extremely divisive; it increased popular alienation from the Liberal State (government) and it heightened expectations of transforming Italy after the war. Italy's national war was 'waged in an atmosphere of civil war.'

Source 2: D. Mack Smith, Italy A Modern History (1969) p. 313

The final figure for the cost of the whole war had been 148 billion lire, that is to say twice the sum of all government expenditure between 1861-1913. This total is a symbol for an enormous consumption of energy and natural resources, in return for which Italy obtained little joy and much grief. A great deal of idealism had gone into the war on Italy's part, and much elevated patriotism, but one need not look many years beyond 1918 to see that it had been one of the greatest disasters of her history. As a result Italy suffered 25 years of revolution and tyranny.

Source 3: The History Channel: 2018

Italy's involvement in World War I is often neglected with the Western and Eastern Fronts being the focal points of remembrance, but for the Italians, their involvement in WWI caused significant loss and human suffering. Italy joined the war in April 1915 and by the end of the war, it is estimated that 600,000 Italians were dead in combat and more than a million were wounded or crippled. The Italian government spent more on the war than it had in the previous 50 years. The war debt, food shortages, bad harvests and significant inflationary increases effectively bankrupted the country, with an estimated half a million civilians dying. In addition, the territorial gains were small in comparison to the monetary cost of the war - the debt contracted to pay for the war's expenses was finally paid back in the 1970s'

Combining skills in History (the hard part!)

Now use the source analysis checklist on page 17 to write a small paragraph which looks at the impact of World War I upon Italy as a nation. Cross reference the sources - do they agree on one main impact? Do they disagree? Overall, what do we learn about the impact of WWI on Italy as a nation?

Additional background reading:

Included at the end of your transition packs are articles from History extra (a key stage 5 history magazine) on Hitler, Mussolini and Dictatorship. **Please read these articles.**

Useful websites to further your knowledge: (Some of these websites are for GCSE students but are an excellent introduction to your new topics.)

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/>

<http://johndclare.net/>

www.facinghistory.org/weimar

<http://spartacus-educational.com/GERforeign.htm?menu=Germany>

Useful DVDS and documentaries: You may be able to find these on YouTube too.

- Nazis a warning from History
- World at war
- The Road to War (1989) BBC
- *Cold War* produced by Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing. Programmes on post-war Germany particularly useful. CNN/BBC
- www.britishpathe.com/video/

Well done for working your way through this pack. Motivation, dedication and independence are all key components to making consistent progress and being successful in your History A level.



Additional reading 1: Mussolini's willing followers

Christopher Duggan, who died earlier this year, was professor of Italian history at the University of Reading and the author of *Fascist Voices: An Intimate History of Mussolini's Italy* (Bodley Head, 2012)

The postwar orthodoxy held that most Italians never truly bought into Fascism. Yet, says Christopher Duggan, who died earlier this year, the devotion to Mussolini expressed in newly analysed diaries and letters of the time tells a very different story.



In a broadcast in December 1940 Winston Churchill famously declared that “one man, and one man alone” – namely Mussolini – was responsible for Italy waging war on Britain. These words were designed to encourage Italians to break with their leader and get out of a conflict for which it was already clear the country was disastrously unprepared. And Churchill delivered them at a telling moment – just as the ill-equipped Italian forces had become bogged down and humiliated in the mud and snow of Albania following Italy's unprovoked offensive against Greece.

Yet the idea that Italian people had simply been the ‘victims’ of a warmongering leader wasn't confined to the dark days of 1940. In fact, the idea would go on to provide powerful ammunition for what, after 1945, became the dominant public interpretation of Fascist Italy: that it was ruled by a dictatorship built on limited or minimal popular support.

Various sources helped to make the idea that Fascism had never really been accepted by the mass of Italians into something of an orthodoxy. The Allies were content to accept it, not least because it spared them the need to press for purges of the public administration which would leave the conservative fabric of the state weakened at a time when the Italian Communist and Socialist parties appeared a major threat.

The church, meanwhile, keen to deflect attention from its collusion with the regime, maintained that Catholicism and Fascism were inherently antithetical, and, since most Italians had remained loyal to the church, they could not (at least in their hearts) have been Fascists. And the far left – who were to be the main standard-bearers of anti-Fascist ideology in the postwar Republic – regarded Fascism as a capitalist dictatorship from which ‘the people’ had liberated themselves with the Resistance.

Something of a backlash set in after the end of the Cold War. The collapse in the early 1990s of the main parties of the postwar Republic – including the Communists and Socialists – opened the way for the parties of the right, headed by Silvio Berlusconi and his ‘post-Fascist’ allies, to launch an attack on ‘anti-Fascism’. Mussolini’s regime, they claimed, had been unfairly demonised by the far left. It had not been a dictatorship forced on an unwilling population, but a largely benign political system. And as an indication of this, they suggested that Fascism had enjoyed high levels of support, at least until the late 1930s. Of course, assessing the level or nature of ‘support’ for a totalitarian regime is notoriously difficult. With opposition forces crushed and dissent often punished, finding reliable evidence of popular opinion is very difficult. Letters can provide some information. So, too, can reports of the secret police. But as has been pointed out for Nazi Germany as well as Fascist Italy, such reports need to be treated with caution given the constraints under which agents operated. What’s more, in the case of Italy the reports on public opinion are restricted mainly to the late 1930s and the Second World War.

Potentially more revealing are private diaries. They too present difficulties with interpretation, as diarists did not necessarily set out simply to record their unalloyed thoughts and feelings. But they offer a better chance of seeing how ordinary people viewed Fascism than most other available sources.

Locating the personal diaries of ordinary people from the interwar years is inevitably difficult, but the National Diary Archive in the Tuscan town of Pieve Santo Stefano has in recent years managed to acquire a quite significant body of material. The majority of the several hundred diaries in its possession that relate to the Fascist period were written during the Second World War, but there are also a substantial number for the 1920s and 1930s.

Those who kept these diaries were necessarily literate – and therefore principally from the urban middle classes – but the range of writers is nonetheless impressive. They include

housewives, students, schoolchildren (who could be startlingly perceptive), teachers, doctors, lawyers, soldiers, sailors, journalists, artisans, professors, priests, shopkeepers, businessmen and civil servants.

What do these unpublished diaries reveal about support for Fascism? One thing that is striking is just how few of the writers were in any sense 'anti-Fascist'. There were of course some risks – particularly in wartime – in penning hostile comments about the regime. But such dangers were not particularly great in private diaries. And you might expect the diarists' moral impulse to record their opposition to the regime to override any anxieties they felt about being caught.

This was the case for two prominent liberal intellectuals, Benedetto Croce and Piero Calamandrei, whose well-known (and published) diaries show that they felt almost viscerally driven to document their revulsion at Fascism.

The notion that parliamentary democracy had been totally discredited formed the basis of most diary-writers' support for Fascism. The liberal regime had become synonymous with weakness and disorder. Typical was the view expressed by an elderly conservative soldier from Sicily, Bruno Palamenghi. He went to hear Mussolini give a speech in Rome in March 1924 and came away more convinced than ever of the need for Fascism:

"Who can forget the state of degeneration to which the masses had been reduced in 1920–1921–1922? There were continuous strikes – the occupations of factories, plants, workshops and land were daily occurrences... And all this because of the weakness of the governments at that time... Just a few months more of that regime, and this beautiful Italy of ours would have been finished, and would have become worse than Russia... Without the Fascist revolution... Italy would have fallen prey to Bolshevism, anarchy, bankruptcy, poverty – and we would have become the laughing-stock and joke of the other nations, worse than we were before the war."

Old and shameful

The idea that Fascism had saved Italy from ruin – whatever the costs in terms of violence and the curtailment of liberty – was at the heart of most people's adhesion. For a majority of diary-writers, there was simply no possible alternative to Fascism: it was necessary in order to make the country better and ensure it did not slip back into its shameful old ways.

If Fascism had its faults – and there was plenty of criticism in diaries about various aspects of the regime, in particular the high levels of corruption in the party – the general feeling was that these would be addressed in due course by reforms. Indeed many diarists in the late 1930s found their almost instinctive alarm at the alliance with Germany, and the introduction of racial laws and other so-called 'anti-bourgeois' measures, tempered by the

thought that these were the kind of developments that could help make the regime stronger and more successful.

Another vital component of popular support for Fascism was the allure of Mussolini. Indeed more than anything else it was the 'cult of the duce' that was the lynchpin of the regime. As the Florentine hotel manager Carlo Ciseri wrote in his diary in 1923, Mussolini was "the superior being sent by God to restore peace to us, and perhaps also the honours and glories of ancient Rome".

The millions of letters (an average of around 1,500 a day) that ordinary Italians sent to Mussolini (many of which have survived) bear testimony to his astonishing appeal and the sense of closeness that people felt to him. The language they used was often fervently religious and, in the case of women, intimate. Typical was a letter from a young woman in Genoa who wrote to Mussolini after hearing him on the radio in March 1938:

"Forgive me if I, just a humble woman, dare to write to you and use [the familiar form of] 'tu'. But when I turn to God I do not use [the formal] 'Voi', and You [Tu] for me are a God, a supernatural being sent to us by a superior power to guide our beautiful Italy to the destiny assigned to it when Romulus and Remus founded Rome, which will become, if you continue to guide us, mistress of the world... My duce, for a long time you have been talking of coming to Genoa... And I have such a desire to see you even if only at a distance and confirm that you are not a myth, but a man, and hear for once your passionate words not through the radio but from your lips. I am waiting for you soon, my duce..."

As such letters and many diaries indicate, much of the emotional force of Fascism derived from the way the cult of the duce meshed with the templates of religion. The church publicly hailed Mussolini's escape from four assassination attempts in 1925–26 as a clear signal of divine protection – and, in doing so, did much to foster the Fascist leader's providential aura. The diary of a young Tuscan woman, who confessed that the duce made her "tremble with excitement" ("I only need to hear his words to be transported in heart and soul into a world of joy and greatness"), shows well the reverence that many Italians accorded Mussolini. In August 1939 she wrote:

"O duce, duce of our life, commander of an entire people, everyone places their love in you, everyone hopes in you... Thank you, O Lord, for having given to Italy the pride and joy of a unique man, the pride and joy of having a man admired and envied by all the world."

The cult of the duce was the supreme expression of Fascist 'faith', and the evidence of diaries – and of the letters that poured into Mussolini's personal secretariat well into the war – shows how extraordinarily internalised and resilient this faith could be. The duce occupied an exalted sphere above the cut and thrust of daily life. He was not responsible for setbacks or misfortunes: the military disasters of 1940–43 were commonly blamed on incompetent advisers or traitors. And as individual suffering increased, so men and women

strove, assiduously in many cases, to preserve Mussolini as a source of consolation and hope. The long and passionate letters that distraught women wrote to the duce after the death of a husband or son were often inspired, it seems, by a need to find meaning for their loss.

The Florentine hotel manager Carlo Ciseri, whose diary contains frequent avowals of faith (“It is true that I am not a [party] member, but that does not count – it should not count. What really matters is Faith: Believing – and I believe. I firmly believe”) was typical of many who found it hard to come to terms with the downfall of Mussolini in July 1943. Carlo was in a prisoner of war camp in Kenya when he learned the news, and was so shocked that he “was overcome with a kind of vertigo”. He refused to believe anything bad about the man he had revered for over 20 years:

“Until they bring me concrete and tangible evidence, I will not be able to believe the infamy that is being hurled in the face of a man who passionately wanted our greatness. Have there been any errors?... Until now he can be accused of only one, namely of having too much goodness, which in a man of government can be called weakness. Certainly this is strange in someone of his kind... Indeed if he had imitated, if only partly, the ferocious Stalin... purging all the scum, we would perhaps not have come to this.”

There were, of course, plenty of Italians who by the summer of 1943 had lost all residual faith in Mussolini and felt angry and betrayed. But given how long the regime had been in existence and how insistent (and seemingly successful) its propaganda had been in persuading people that Fascism was the true embodiment of Italian history and Italian values, the process of emotional disengagement was often hard.

Despite what was later claimed, in reality countless Italians had for many years been strongly committed to the regime and above all to the duce. The fact that dozens and sometimes hundreds of people every day still visit Mussolini’s tomb in his home town of Predappio and sign their names in the register (often with passionate dedications) shows that the ‘myth’ of the duce has still not disappeared.

Fascism: An Italian phenomenon?

Mussolini’s regime was the prototype fascist state and it is hard to overestimate its influence on politics in the 20th century. Hitler was one of Mussolini’s strongest early admirers, and the Nazi movement would almost certainly not have developed as it did without the Italian example.

In the 1930s especially, when the liberal capitalist model seemed everywhere in crisis, Mussolini’s Italy inspired a broad array of political movements in countries ranging from

Argentina and Brazil in South America, to Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Romania and Poland in Europe, to China in the far east. These movements all had different features and emphases, not least because at the heart of fascism was the idea of asserting the threatened identity of the nation, especially against communism.

Hence in the case of Italy, the idea of Rome and its universal mission played an important role. In Franco's Spain, the Catholic Reconquista of the Middle Ages provided an emotionally powerful point of historical reference.

Given how influential Italian Fascism has been – far more so than Hitler's Third Reich, whose extreme racism and brutal expansionism place it on the radical edge of the spectrum – the fact that fascism has, since 1945, so often been viewed through the filter of Nazism has probably made for historical distortion.

Mussolini – the populist charismatic leader – is much more the prototype of the 20th-century dictator than Hitler. And though anti-Semitism was common to numerous fascist movements, it was not as central to many as it was for Nazism.

Arguably, it was the defence of religious values, seen as vital elements of national identity against the materialistic doctrines of liberalism and communism, that was a more important common factor.

Additional reading 2: Rise of a dictator: how did Hitler gain power and become the führer of Germany?

Adolf Hitler was a failed painter on the fringes of local politics, so how did he manage to amass so much influence that he had a dictatorship bestowed on him? Writing for *BBC History Revealed*, Roger Moorhouse charts how Hitler stage-managed his way to power – transforming from feckless would-be artist into a suave politician.



In October 1922, Munich photographer Heinrich Hoffmann received an intriguing telegram. He was used to getting picture commissions, but the request – from an American photographic agency – was remarkable, because it offered the (then) huge fee of \$100 for a picture of a little-known Munich politician. That politician's name was Adolf Hitler.

Hitler was a relative newcomer to the Munich political scene. He had first emerged late in 1919, as an impassioned speaker for the nationalist German Workers' Party (DAP), a small clique of disgruntled right-wing misfits. By the following spring, however, he had effectively engineered a takeover of the party, giving it the direction he felt it had lacked and renaming it the NSDAP – adding 'National Socialist' to the title.

By 1922, though Hitler's Nazi Party (as it was known) was making some political progress, it was still largely a Munich phenomenon. Hitler was barely known outside of Bavaria.

In such circumstances, Hoffmann's interest was piqued, and when he began to make enquiries about fulfilling the request, he discovered the reason for the high price. Keen to raise funds for his party, Hitler was severely rationing his own image to that end, creating a

mystique around himself and using his bodyguards to prevent unauthorised photographers from taking his picture. It was a canny move.

Hitler is often viewed as someone slightly otherworldly; a man so obsessed with his odious political mission that he cared little for the daily business of politics and resolutely aloof from frivolous concerns about his image or his public profile.



By capturing his rehearsals on camera, Hitler and Hoffmann could decide on which gestures to use during public speaking (Photo by Heinrich Hoffmann/Keystone Features/Getty Images)

Yet, as this example clearly demonstrates, that assumption is wholly incorrect. Though Hitler was certainly a political obsessive, that did not imply a lack of concern for what we would now call public relations – the art of the political sell. At a time when few politicians were conscious of such matters, Hitler, conversely, paid great attention to them.

How did Hitler build his image?

While Hitler was busy building that public profile, his first opportunity to grasp for power presented itself. In November 1923, with the country reeling from runaway hyperinflation, communist risings and a Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, it appeared for a season that Germany itself would scarcely survive.

Hitler sought to exploit the crisis by engineering a coup – the so-called Beer Hall Putsch – in which he and his supporters attempted to seize political power in Munich, as a prelude to a takeover in Berlin.

The Beer Hall Putsch

When Hitler was arraigned for trial in Munich in the spring of 1924, many contemporary commentators imagined that it would spell the end for the aspiring demagogue. Hitler had been arrested the previous November, a few days after leading his Nazi movement in a daytime march through central Munich, which was intended as a show of force, aiming at

seizing power in Bavaria and then in Berlin; a reprise of Mussolini's March on Rome, which had brought the Fascist leader to power the previous year.

But, after sweeping aside a number of police pickets, Hitler's marchers finally met their match by the Feldherrnhalle on the Odeonsplatz, where a detachment of Bavarian police refused to back down and fired on the column. In the mêlée, 15 Nazis were killed along with one unlucky waiter nearby, who was caught in the cross-fire. Hitler, wrenched to the ground by the dying man beside him and shielded by his loyal bodyguard Ulrich Graf, escaped with only a dislocated shoulder. Despite its failure, the Putsch would become the founding legend of the Nazi movement.

The subsequent trial was a complex affair. Hitler probably should have been sent for trial to the constitutional court at Leipzig, but Munich's political establishment was keen to keep the matter 'in house', for fear of giving oxygen to the rumours of official complicity with the Nazis. So, with a tame, sympathetic judge – Georg Neithardt – presiding, the trial opened in the Munich infantry school on 26 February.

Those hoping for Hitler's political demise were to be disappointed. He expertly played the court, assisted by Neithardt, and so reached a much wider audience than he had ever reached before. By the end of the trial, he had a national following for the first time, and had emerged as the undisputed leader of the German radical right.

However, when Hitler and his followers met the guns of the Bavarian state police, on the Odeonsplatz in central Munich, the coup attempt collapsed in chaos. Arrested in the aftermath, Hitler was charged with treason and arraigned for trial, and many contemporaries speculated that it was the end of his political career. Hitler, however, had other ideas.

Though he briefly contemplated suicide, he resolved to use the platform provided to him by his trial to proselytise for the Nazi cause. Shamelessly playing to the press gallery, and indulged by a sympathetic judge, Hitler was able to exploit the trial as a public relations opportunity, pouring scorn on Germany's political leaders and gaining a name for himself nationwide.

At the close of proceedings, he even goaded the court, ridiculing the insignificance of its deliberations: "It is not you, gentlemen, who pass judgement," he said. "You may pronounce us guilty a thousand times over, but the goddess of the eternal court of history will smile and tear to tatters the sentence of this court. For she acquits us."

Hitler had been arraigned for trial alongside eight other 'leaders' of the coup attempt, yet such was his performance that by the end, he had become the senior partner. Though he was sentenced to five years detention, he had emerged as the leader of the German radical right.

How did Hitler gain power?

In the years that followed, Germany recovered from the crisis of 1923, and Hitler – though released from imprisonment after only nine months – sank into relative obscurity, subjected as he was to a nationwide public-speaking ban. However, despite his enforced silence, he was far from inactive. He continued speaking to private audiences, and he worked hard to polish both his speaking skills and his public image. In this, the photographer Heinrich Hoffmann would play a crucial role, forging in the process a lasting and lucrative relationship with Hitler – one that history has often overlooked.

Throughout the 1920s, Hoffman assisted Hitler in honing his public image, photographing him in a variety of outfits to establish those ‘looks’ that worked to Hitler’s advantage, and those that didn’t. Lederhosen and SA caps were out, sober suits and ties were in. He also helped Hitler finesse the often elaborate gestures that he employed while speaking, photographing his subject in his Munich studio, before meticulously going through the images with Hitler to weed out those gestures and actions that appeared too ridiculous or overblown, and identify those that might be used again.



Hitler is released after spending nine months in jail. (Photo by Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)

In this capacity, Hitler also engaged a former actor and self-styled mystic, Erik Jan Hanussen, who advised him on his presentation skills. Hanussen told him that, though his delivery was persuasive, he should employ a more expansive use of gesture and body language to enhance the effect that he had with his audience.

The results were impressive. As a speaker, Hitler quickly gained a formidable reputation, and his delivery was often described as inspirational, even as a quasi-religious experience. Though he spoke with only cursory notes, he was meticulous in his preparation, paying close attention to what he wore, the lighting and layout of the stage.

He would customarily pause for a few moments before speaking, allowing a tense silence to ramp up the expectation. Then he would begin in a rather quiet, even hesitant manner,

forcing his audience to listen intently to his words. In due course, he would begin to raise his voice, stressing certain words and syllables, elaborately rolling his 'r's, becoming more expressive and impassioned, and employing the gestures that he had so diligently rehearsed with Hanussen and Hoffmann.

Over two hours or so, Hitler would range widely – at times angry, scornful, even darkly funny – expertly channelling the hopes, fears and prejudices of his audience. By the end, he would be physically exhausted, bathed in sweat and emotionally drained. His audience, more often than not, were spellbound.



Hitler's impassioned speeches – delivered with such vitriol they often left him foaming at the mouth – were a core part of his persona (Photo by Getty Images)

In private, too, Hitler developed a persona. He could often be socially awkward. He found ordinary conversation difficult and had a predisposition to rant and preach. And, as his secretary Christa Schroeder recalled, he had the habit of holding eye-contact when meeting someone for the first time, as if to mesmerise them, or peer into their soul. Much of this, too, was part of the act – fostering a sense that he was a man apart, not like other politicians, not entirely of this world.

The result, by around 1930, was a carefully constructed public profile. From the zealous fervour of his speeches to his simple dress sense and social awkwardness, Hitler was selling a novel vision to his followers and to the wider German public, offering national redemption, a 'new Germany', a 'new man', a 'new Jerusalem'.

That religious analogy is not misplaced. There was much in the ceremony of Nazism – and in the central role of Hitler himself – that strongly echoed religious ritual. The Nazi movement had its 'martyrs' – those killed in the Beer Hall Putsch. It had its 'relics', most important among them the 'Blood Flag', a swastika soaked in the blood of those same martyrs from 1923. It also had a 'bible' in the shape of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* – a rambling, pretentious autobiography-cum-manifesto, which he wrote while imprisoned for treason in 1924.

At the centre of it all, of course, was Hitler himself – a lapsed Catholic who understood all too well the lure of the sacred. His public persona proclaimed him to be unlike his contemporaries; he was a genius, plucked from obscurity by providence to pursue his vital mission. He had no equals and no mentors, only followers. He had emerged, fully formed, beholden to no-one, a man apart. He was not a politician – he was a messiah.

Mein Kampf

Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf* (or *My Struggle*) during his nine months imprisoned in Landsberg Prison in 1924.

It was a curious book – part Nazi manifesto, part rose-tinted autobiography, with excursions into Hitler's theories on race, antisemitism, anti-Bolshevism, anti-capitalism, the uses of propaganda and the failings of democracy. It is famously turgid in style, so crammed with Hitler's verbose musings that one reviewer dubbed it "Sein Krampf" ("His Cramp").

Understandably, perhaps, sales were initially rather sluggish after the book was published in 1925, but they picked up as Hitler's political stock rose.

By 1933, it had already sold some 300,000 copies, and would sell some 12 million more in the years that followed, providing Hitler with a handsome personal income, which – among other things – funded his purchase of the Berghof above Berchtesgaden.

Remarkably perhaps, this public image – carefully crafted though it was – was not particularly successful by itself. Hitler's Nazis languished in the polls through the 1920s, hampered not only by the speaking ban imposed upon their leader between 1925 and 1927, but also by the improvements in the German economy and stabilisation in domestic and international politics, all of which made Hitler's radical vision less attractive.

In 1928, for instance, the Nazi Party polled just 2.6 per cent of the vote nationally, coming a poor ninth in the election with barely 800,000 votes, just ahead of the German Farmers' Party. For all his messianic pretensions, Hitler was scarcely getting his message across. His party was flirting with insignificance.

What changed, of course, was the Great Depression – the world economic crisis that resulted from the Wall Street Crash of October 1929. As foreign capital investment dried up in the aftermath, the German economic recovery stalled and was tipped into recession. Within months, German businesses were closing, staff were being laid off and wages were falling. By the end of 1930, German unemployment had already more than doubled to three million; by 1932, it would double again, totalling 30 percent of the working population.

Why was the Wall Street Crash an opportunity for Hitler?

When the American stock market crashed in October 1929, the consequences were felt across the world, but perhaps most spectacularly in Germany. There, where the economic recovery of the 1920s had been largely funded by American loans and investments, the resulting removal of those funds tipped the German economy into a catastrophic

deflationary spiral, with wages shrinking, businesses folding and a huge growth in unemployment.

This would have been difficult enough for the German people, but additionally their economy had only recently recovered from the hyperinflation crisis of 1923, in which the money-printing policy of World War I, and its aftermath, caused the total collapse of the German currency.

These two economic crises in tandem would have profound political consequences, weakening the already fragile public faith in capitalism and contributing to a paralysis in government, which in turn undermined the German political system.

The primary beneficiary of all this upheaval was Hitler's Nazi Party, which duly rose to become the largest party in the parliament by 1932. In January of the following year, Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany.

In such circumstances, Hitler's message of a radical reshaping of the economy and society found a ready echo. The German electorate, steeled perhaps against a single crisis, had endured two debilitating economic agonies in six years – the hyperinflation of 1923, and the Great Depression of 1929 – so it was little wonder, perhaps, that their faith in capitalism and democracy was evaporating. It would primarily be Hitler's Nazis who reaped the electoral rewards, benefiting from a flight from the political centre that saw them rise from 2.6 per cent of the vote in 1928 to 37 per cent in 1932.

The problem of Hitler's niece

However, just as the stars appeared to be aligning for Hitler, a new crisis erupted that threatened to derail his career and dent that polished public image. In September 1931, Hitler's 23-year-old niece, Angela 'Geli' Raubal, committed suicide in his Munich apartment, using his pistol.

Raubal had been living with Hitler for some time, and the relationship appears – despite countless rumours to the contrary – to have been purely platonic. Vivacious and quick-witted, Raubal was Hitler's regular companion to cultural and political events, referring to him as Uncle Alf.



A young girl hands Hitler a gift. Images like these were widely shared in an attempt to portray him as a family man. (Photo by Imagno/Getty Images)

The reason for her suicide is not clear. There had been difficulties between the two in the months leading up to her death, with Raubal keen to move to Vienna to pursue a singing career, and Hitler adamant she should stay in Munich to complete her studies. She had also had a brief relationship with Hitler's chauffeur, Emil Maurice, which Hitler had disapproved of, and put an end to. It is perhaps most likely that Raubal, in a fit of melancholy, was looking for a way to give voice to her unhappiness. Her suicide may have been a cry for help gone tragically wrong.

In the aftermath, no speculation was too lurid for the German press, spurred – quite naturally – by Hitler's political opponents. The nature of the relationship between Raubal and her 'Uncle Alf' was an obvious focus, and the tabloids of the day conjectured wildly whether Hitler might be a masochist engaged in an incestuous affair, or that Raubal might have been pregnant with his child, or that she was murdered on his orders.

In response, the Nazi Party was forced into an urgent damage-limitation exercise, as their leader and their recent electoral gains risked being swept away by a rising tide of sordid innuendo. Hitler, for his part, issued a formal rebuttal of the rumours and demanded a retraction from the press. The party machine, meanwhile, mounted an attempt to repackage its leader.

The oddball, otherworldly messiah-figure had now, overnight, become something of an electoral liability, so Hitler would be recast as a chaste, cultured aesthete; more statesman than prophet.

As so often, it was Heinrich Hoffmann who led the propaganda charge. In 1932, six months after Raubal's death, he published a glossy picture volume entitled *Hitler, wie ihn keiner kennt* (*The Hitler Nobody Knows*), which showcased Hitler's domesticity, portraying him as a man of simple pleasures, most at home in the Bavarian mountains or alone with his dog.

For the first time, Hitler's private life, or at least a sanitised facsimile of it, became a weapon in the public relations fight. Where previously what he did away from the political stage was kept deliberately opaque – messiahs, after all, did not have private lives – now it was harnessed to the political cause.

Hitler would be actively portrayed as an ordinary citizen; an educated and cultured bachelor; a man of old-fashioned Viennese manners; a kisser of ladies' hands; a gracious patron who enjoyed the open air, was kind to children and animals, and was above all passionately devoted to the German people. It was a fabricated image, of course, just as much as his earlier incarnation as a messiah had been, but it worked. The political fall-out from Raubal's death was restricted, and the Nazi bandwagon rolled on.

In late January 1933, Hitler was appointed German Chancellor. Barely two months later, on 24 March, he forced the Enabling Act through the Reichstag using intimidation and coercion

to secure votes. The act allowed Hitler to pass laws without scrutiny – elevating him to the position of dictator.

Was Hitler the first modern politician?

When examining Hitler's rise, it is conventional – and perfectly correct – to look primarily at those factors that were most directly influential: the economic crisis of 1929, the resulting collapse of the political centre, and the toxic sense of grievance and humiliation that had so poisoned German society in the 1920s.

Yet, alongside those headline contributors, it is important also to examine the influence of less well-known factors. The invention, maintenance and metamorphosis behind Hitler's public image is one such element, and one that rarely receives the attention that it deserves.

In the modern day, every political figure is required, to some degree, to manufacture a public image. We regard it as essential. But what is remarkable here is that Hitler was doing it – and the extent to which he was doing it – in the 1920s, when few of his contemporaries were even aware of the dark arts of spin-doctoring and image management. In this respect, therefore, it is appropriate to regard Hitler as one of the first truly modern politicians.

Roger Moorhouse is a historian and author specialising in modern German and Central European history, with particular interest in Nazi Germany, the Holocaust and World War II in Europe

Additional reading 3: How do dictators seize power? The malevolent careers of eight 20th-century leaders explained

Teacher note: the sections on Mussolini and Hitler are most relevant to your course but an interesting read to learn more about dictatorship as a theme.

How do dictators gain power? In the latest episode of the *HistoryExtra* podcast, historian Frank Dikötter talks to our deputy digital editor Elinor Evans about his new book *How to Be a Dictator*, which explores the malevolent careers of eight 20th-century rulers including Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Mussolini. Read the full, unedited interview below.

Elinor Evans, deputy digital editor of *HistoryExtra*: Your book *How To Be A Dictator: The Cult of Personality in the 20th Century* focuses on eight figures that many of our listeners will be familiar with. Could you talk about this 'cult of personality' and how it links these eight figures together?

Frank Dikötter: The book does as it says it really; how to be a dictator. It traces every step these eight dictators take to seize power and stay in power for as long as they can. Some fail, some succeed. Hitler dies, kills himself. Stalin and Mao die in their beds.

I believe that there are two main instruments that dictators use – one is terror and the other one is image. Now the terror, we know – the concentration camps; the secret police; the knock-on-the-door in the middle of the night; the atrocious crimes against humanity – but I think image, in particular the 'cult of personality', we tend to overlook a bit – even though if you look at the 20th century, literally hundreds of millions of people cheered their own dictators, even as they were led down the road to serve them. I thought *that* was rather striking; so the book does focus quite a bit as well on that cult of personality. I don't think it's a French phenomenon; I think it's very much fear and image that go hand-in-hand.

Now, why is this cult so important? Because I think there is a paradox at the very heart of modern dictatorship: people in an age of democracy are supposed to be sovereign – it is they who elect those who should represent them. But dictators go for a shortcut; they seize power, and once they do this, through violence, they realise that they must maintain it through violence – violence is a very blunt instrument. Of course they need the police; they need the praetorian guard; they need to rely on armed forces (torturers, spies, informers, you name it)... but the cult of personality helps a great deal. They *must* instil fear into the

population at large, but if they compel ordinary people to acclaim them in public, they will last a lot longer.

The second point about the cult of personality is not to do with the population at large; it's to do with their inner circle. These people were not elected; in other words, they are – rather paradoxically – weak, they seize power, but by seizing power they run the risk that someone else might do exactly the same thing to them. There might be traitors in the ranks; there might be equally ambitious rivals – so it raises the prospect of a stab in the back. How do you keep control of your inner circle? Of course, there are many techniques – and I go through many of them with my eight dictators. There is manipulation; there are constant purges with people quite literally being dragged out and shot in the back; there is divide and rule. But again, the cult of personality works rather well.

If a dictator can compel not only his allies but also his rivals to acclaim him, in public, it creates a very different sort of context. Most of all, with the cult of personality, there is a point since all of them have to acclaim the dictator in public, all of them become liars. When people lie, it becomes very difficult to find out who thinks what; it becomes very difficult to organise a coup because you have no idea who stands where. So in that sense, the cult of personality really makes everyone a captive.

EE: Can you give us a quick introduction to the eight dictators who feature in your work?

FD: Yes, I did it chronologically. I start with Mussolini – he's very much the first one (not counting Lenin of course, with the Bolshevik revolution of 1917). He is the very first one to start his own cult of personality. Lenin is, of course, glorified already while he's alive but in particular after his death. So Mussolini really must be the first one in there, although one might say he's only half a dictator – his image has to compete with that of the pope and of course the king. It will be the king who will have him arrested at the end of his career, so to speak.

The second one seems reasonably straightforward – Adolf Hitler, how can you miss him? Or Stalin. Or Mao Zedong. All of these being the classic 20th century dictators. I've put Kim Il-Sung in there for North Korea. Now to some extent, he's even faster or better than Mao in seizing control of his own country, imposing a dictatorship and promoting his own cult – which assumes huge proportions.

I thought I had to take three figures who are not necessarily all that well known, but somehow, I think, shed light on the five big ones. One of these is Papa Doc (François Duvalier) in Haiti, and the second one is Ceaușescu, because he is truly utterly insane and probably the only one who truly believes in his own cult, believes he's a genius, *the* genius of Romania. The final one is Mengistu. A few readers may have heard of him, but he's one of the great mass murders of Africa (in Ethiopia).

EE: Your first point obviously – you said that there's no cult without that fear aspect – so how did these dictators foster their self-image alongside the brutality that came hand-in-hand with their regimes?

FD: They work at it tirelessly, from the very beginning. Adolf Hitler works at his image, and, of course, also works at building up his own party from the very beginning – the early 1920s onwards. It is he who designs those garage-red flyers that attract new recruits; it is he who is behind the marches, the flags, etc. And, of course, he is behind his own image; he hires a photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, to produce photos that project sheer strength of character and iron determination. And again and again, he works at building up his own image as a charismatic leader. You can read *Mein Kampf*, for instance. In there, of course, is a very clear program: aggregate the Versailles treaty; get rid of the Jews, make Germany greater, invade the Soviet Union. But there are also many elements of the Hitler myth – you know, the voracious reader, the born orator, the unrecognised artist driven by destiny to save his people. So they spend a great deal of time ‘working at it’.

Mussolini, by one account, spends pretty much half of his time projecting his own image as the omniscient, omnipotent, indispensable leader of Italy, on top of running about half a dozen ministries. So, again and again, with each dictator it becomes very clear that *they* are ultimately responsible for building up their own cult. They begin with a low-key approach and with every step that they increase the terror, they manage to compel people to acclaim them in public, to cheer them in public. And the key point here – coming back to what you said – is that the cult often is seen as brainless enthusiasm. But it’s not about that; it’s really about making sure that nobody knows *who* thinks *what* – so ‘fear’ at the very heart of the cult of personality. If you want to know whether there is a cult of personality, you go to a country and you find out whether you can find anyone who has anything negative to say about the man in charge. If the answer is no, you will know what a cult of personality is. I say ‘man’, because they are invariably men.

EE: So, what about the people they ruled over, and possibly appealed to as well? What conclusions did you draw about them?

FD: They are great actors. Dictators are great actors. In an unguarded moment, Adolf Hitler said that he is “Europe’s greatest performer”. Mussolini thought of himself as a great actor. We forget, also, that ordinary people have to become great actors themselves; they have to chant on command; they have to parrot the party line; they have to invoke the slogans; they have to cry, cheer, shout... on command.

There’s a mythological point here; if it is a dictatorship, you don’t know what people think. It’s a very basic point. There’s no good way in which we can find out what people *really*, quote unquote, *believe* under Hitler, Stalin, Mao, etc. I’m not trying to say that these dictators have no supporters at all. The only thing I’m trying to say is that as a result of the cult, we don’t know who believes what. It’s very difficult to say who believes what. But again, there is plenty of evidence – in the case of Hitler, in the case of Stalin, Mao, Kim Un Sung and all the others – that there are always people who refuse to go along with this cult of personality – and they’re the ones who will be arrested, interrogated, imprisoned or occasionally shot. So it is not just some bizarre ritual that operates under fear.

Now the point here, really, about ordinary people is to make clear that the cult of personality is not designed to convince, or to persuade people that their leader truly is a great genius; no, the cult is there to *destroy* common sense, to destroy reason, to sow confusion, to enforce obedience, to literally isolate individuals and crush their dignity. People have to self-monitor what they say and how they say it – and in turn they start monitoring other people.

EE: You mentioned, as we've been talking, how they edited their own image and a massive part of this was control of the press...

FD: Yes. In the case of Mussolini, he's so obsessed with control that after a couple of years he is in control of about half a dozen ministries. It's a dictatorship at every level; he will find time to change the colour of a women's magazine in the 1930s. It's the same for Duvalier in Haiti, which of course is a much smaller island, with a much smaller population. He will prescribe who can graduate; how Creole should be spelt; what people can read; which side of the road the cars should drive; it's an extraordinary dictatorship down to every little detail. They're obsessive, some of them.

Now all of them realise that control of the press is important; that no good dictator will allow freedom of press to continue for very long. In fact, the very first act will be to close down publication houses and to eliminate, step-by-step, every single freedom. This happens in Germany within two or three years; it happens under Mussolini in about five six years... everywhere freedom of speech becomes the victim. These are replaced by massive ministries of propaganda. And these dictators – Stalin, Mussolini and Duvalier – do that very carefully; they scrutinize what happens. What is so interesting about Mussolini is that he replaces those in charge of propaganda every 3/4/5 years to make sure that he's the one who retains ultimate control of how his image is projected to the rest of the population. So the words of the dictator, whether it is under Hitler in Germany or Stalin or Mao or Kim Il-Sung, is everywhere and in every newspaper – there are posters everywhere. The voice of the dictator frequently, but not always, will pursue you wherever you go – certainly in the case of Germany, with loudspeaker pillars erected in cities and mobile ones taken to the countryside. Not so in the case of Stalin, who cultivates a very remote image – so you will rarely see him in the newsreels; you will very rarely hear his voice. He very deliberately cultivates an image of remoteness. But again, as I said, Stalin himself is a compulsive editor who will check everything that is said about him in the press; every photo must be censored and approved; every word attributed to him must be approved. So it's a great amount of work – they work very hard. It's just not easy to be a dictator (just in case some of your listeners think that they might have a go at it); it demands a great amount of almost obsessive labour and I think, to be fair to, demands a good deal of talent. Some of them are very talented – and not just organisational skills.

EE: Can you speak a little bit more about that? In many of these cases, whether it's their natural state or not, a lot of these men do seem to have this charisma that they can turn on and off...

FD: Well, one skill they have is that they are great actors. They can literally not just do it with foreigners, but with people who were quite close to them. I find it always amazing that after years of collaborating with Mao Zedong, the number 2 in charge just before the cultural revolution, Liu Shaoqi, still doesn't see how extraordinarily duplicitous his master really is. In terms of China, only one man really sees through it and that's Lin Biao, a general who was more or less eliminated when he died in a plane accident in September 1971 – it puts an end to the role of the army in the cultural revolution. But Lin Biao writes, at the height of the Great Leap Forward (when literally tens of millions of people were worked, starved and beaten to death), Lin Biao writes that Mao is someone who will only take credit and he will not be criticised for anything; you must flatter him all day long. And then he writes in his own private diary that the Great Leap Forward is a “complete disaster”; Lin Biao clearly understands how duplicitous his master really is. It's the same with Stalin. He's very good at presenting this image of a man that is rather simple and quite approachable... they're always very good at controlling their emotions. Neither Mao nor Stalin will react when somebody opposes them; they know how to bide their time; they know how to calculate – in a very cold manner – and they know how to strike like a cobra when they need to.

EE: Can we talk about the role of visibility in this self-curation, because there is often a desire, it seems, for dictators to portray themselves as humble, accessible 'men of the people' type icons – and you explore this in a number of ways. Can you talk about this?

FD: Most of them – there are always common features, but you'll always find an exception to the rule. A great many of them do cultivate this image of modesty. Hitler is not one of them. Duvalier, Papa Doc in Haiti, knows full well that when he presents himself as an electoral candidate in 1957 he has virtually no chance to succeed, because these elections are really nothing but a show piece organised by the military. So he assumes the air of a very unassuming country doctor, a man who wouldn't harm a fly, who is devoted to the welfare of his subjects. Of course, the moment he is granted power, with the protection of the military, he turns around and purges the ranks of the army.

In the case of Stalin, it is slightly different. There is a paradox in the Soviet Union (and other communist countries), namely that the Soviet Union is supposed to be the dictatorship of the proletariat, not that one particular individual. It's ok for Hitler and Mussolini to make their own spar the guiding principle of their country; to put themselves at the centre of their own ideology. But not so if you are a Marxist Leninist. So how does Stalin get around this? By creating the illusion that it is not him, but rather the people who want to see him, the people who adore him; it is the population, the masses, who pays homage to him because he is the embodiment of the revolution. In the case of Stalin, there is another element to this. His main rival is Trotsky, from 1924-28 he spends his time plotting against Trotsky – who is finally isolated and expelled from the country. Once abroad, Trotsky starts writing about Stalin as a rather devious, underhanded, mediocre character. So what Stalin does is he invites a string of writers and journalists to visit him at his office at the Kremlin – and what he does is he presents himself as a very plain, simple and ordinary man. So again, the

way these dictators present themselves is extraordinarily calculated – all of them are literally acting.

EE: You talk about this phenomenon that is a result of the curation of image, that when things start to go wrong within the regime, a lot of the population are still inclined to blame underlings, or the party – rather than the leader. How do we see that playing out in the figures featured in your book?

FD: It's one of the great advantages of the cult of personality that the dictator towers above allies and rivals alike. You must not forget that in the case of Mussolini – and in the case of Stalin, whose main rival was Trotsky (a far more well-known figure, a far better orator, a far better writer, a far better revolutionary than Stalin) – they have rivals around them. When Mussolini seizes power with his march on Rome in 1922, he is but one of several quite determined fascist leaders. So the cult of personality is a way to abase all of them, exploit their rivalries, and have them collaborate and common subordination – that's the key here.

EE: So as well as being reliant on many subordinates who supported their image, the figures in your book, there are crossovers and relationships between them. It seems that there is envy between dictators, they learn from one another's mistakes – what can you say about that?

FD: Ultimately dictators and students of power. And ultimately you can say that my book is a study of power; how to seize it, how to keep it, what to do with it. So what they will read might not just be, in the case of Marxist dictators, the classics of Engels and Marx. It might be anything, anything that helps them to study how to take power and how to keep it. As a result, of course, they observe each other; they are very interested in how others manage and how others fail. In the case of Mao – good old chairman Mao – he takes so much from Stalin, including Stalinism and the cult of personality, but believes that Stalin has failed miserably in spotting his nemesis: Nikita Khrushchev, who, of course, starts destalinisation in 1956, three years after the death of Stalin. Stalin's body is literally dragged out of the mausoleum – so Mao is determined not to meet the same fate. What is his answer? His answer is the cultural revolution. Since Stalin failed to spot Khrushchev as his enemy, Mao thinks let ordinary people hunt down anyone at any level within the party who might have harboured reservations about his rule. So this is the cultural revolution: people are pitted against people; ordinary people can denounce party members, all the way to the very top. In the end, it becomes an endless cycle of violence in which people are desperate to prove their loyalty to the chairman. And he reigns supreme; he feels secure enough at the very end of his life to somehow reign in the cult of personality.

EE: Without wanting to trivialise the brutality of any of these regimes or people, there certainly are elements of the preposterous that come out in your book when you look at the incessant self-curation of this image. What can you say? Can you give some examples of how it descends into the ridiculous...

FD: I think the more successful ones are the ones who were able to very carefully curate their own quotes and control it until the very end, without necessarily believing in all of it. Let me take Stalin; he is a compulsive editor. He will pour over newspapers, revise articles, look at how he is written and how he will be published. He literally is a gardener who will prune his cult of personality and cutback to allow it to flourish in good seasons, so to speak.

The same is truth of Mao. At the very end of his life, he feels very secure. He allows the cult to be somehow cutback from the height of the cultural revolution. What I'm trying to say, is that all dictators very much teeter between hubris and paranoia; hubris because they are surrounded by sycophants or flatterers. In the end they tend to make all the decisions themselves, with fatal consequences for huge numbers of people. Stalin makes the mistake of signing a pact with Hitler, for instance. Hitler makes the mistake of invading the Soviet Union, which will be his downfall etc, etc. And the paranoia – hubris and paranoia – in the sense that they are constantly afraid of others.

It doesn't help that they get older. At the end of his life, Stalin was probably more paranoid than ever, and continued the purges, ordering even larger statues of himself. But the point I'm trying to make is that some of them, the ones who tend to fail, in particular Ceaușescu, start believing in their own cult. I've no doubt that Ceaușescu (Romania), after a while, starts to believe that he is the genius that the people portray him to be. He's got a never-ending insatiable appetite for more distinctions – university degrees and honours, he collects them very much like a stamp collector. He becomes a victim of the cult himself! I said earlier on that the cult is there to make the general population (and members of the inner circle) a captive. But Ceaușescu becomes a prisoner of his own cult – believes in it and fails to read the signs. He is very upset, very full of disbelief, that the population actually turns against him – he can't see it.

EE: You mentioned this paranoia as a common theme in the fall of these dictators. Did you find any other commonalities with what brought these cults to an end?

FD: The paranoia is of course there all along. In the case of Adolf Hitler, it is said of him that he has an instinct from the very beginning that tells him who he can trust and who he can't. Of Mussolini, it is said he has a peasant's suspicion of other people. All of them are extremely suspicious of others, in particular those that might stab them in the back. I think this is probably one of the great attributes of dictators – that they trust no one. In the case of Duvalier, and in the case of Stalin, and in the case of Mao, they prevail because they're happy to purge/punish/occasionally execute friends and foes alike. It helps a great deal; you should never trust the hand that feeds you, you should always turn against it. In Ethiopia, Mengistu is someone who is mentored by a general a mere year or two after the coup of 1974 against the emperor. Mengistu has a team sent to his mentor's home, where is shot dead.

EE: What's it been like living with these dictators? Was there anyone there who you wish you could have included or were these men self-selecting for your book?

FD: I had a longlist of about 12, but then you realise that it's an awful lot of work to write so much. And in any event, I think about eight seems to me to be the right number, to see common features – but also to see that in every single case there will be an exception to the rule. So you can't come up with the title of 'how to be a dictator', you can't come up with the 12 characteristics of the dictator. You might say, for instance, that every dictator basically relies on what is basically the Leninist conception of a revolution – that you have a party that carries through the revolution and engineers it from above: the revolutionary vanguard. Hitler has one; Mussolini has one. Both are admirers of Lenin. But not so Duvalier, he does not have any party at all. Mengistu seizes power but doesn't start building up a Marxist party until many years later – some 10 years after the revolution, so there is always an exception to the rule. So I thought eight was about right. I had Gaddafi on my shortlist but he didn't quite make it.

I think there is another question: who would you like to spend an afternoon with? Well they're all quite awful. I think there might be a slight misconception because of Hitler, in the sense that we only see him rant and rave at crowds. There is only one tape available where he speaks normally to another human being – a recording made when he was traveling on a train. It sounds reasonably straightforward, but nonetheless he always dominated the conversation – there's not a lot you could say. Possibly Kim Il-Sung; he would have been not only a charming man – like many others – but also someone who would have been interested in a conversation (unlike the others), so he would have been the one I would pick, if I had to be punished with spending an afternoon having tea with one of them.

EE: Well we won't inflict that on you! You do write that dictators today – with the exception of Kim Jong-Un – are a long way from instilling the fear of their predecessors. But nevertheless, you do question (in the book) whether we are seeing a revival of some of these techniques on the world stage today. Where are we seeing the cult of personality today?

FD: Putin comes to mind. I think only about a week ago, slandering Putin was outlawed. This tells me that he is not really a very good dictator, because a good dictator would have done this many years ago! A good friend of mine says you can go to Moscow and you can google quite a few things about Putin – and you will find the people that disagree with him. Look at the demonstrations going on in Moscow, right?

When it comes to Kim III – I call him Kim III, it really is a dynasty – then quite clearly we are dealing with a straightforward, old-fashioned 20th-century dictatorship. Xi Jinping, across the border in China, I think is very close to being one of those old-fashioned dictators; he certainly has quite drastically closed down that country over the last number of years. You may remember what I said earlier that there is a very simple test: go to a country and try to find somebody who speaks out against the man in charge. This is very difficult in the People's Republic of China today; people are demonstrating by the hundreds of thousands in Hong Kong, but across the border it is difficult to find any one person who offers support for Hong Kong. It is not a clash of civilizations, but an indication of the extent to which public opinion is strictly controlled there. So yes, Xi Jinping has his little red book. And, yes, Xi

Jinping has his whole iconography. And yes, he towers well above his peers – and it would be as far above dangerous to speak out against him. There is a good list of people. But even if we look at North Korea. The extent of human misery and death is measured by the tens of millions in those regimes in the 20th century – it would be very hard to say that it is similar today; they are not on the ascendant, they are playing a losing game. It may not seem to us like that; it might seem that democracy is on the attack. Now it's always good to be vigilant, we must be vigilant – but seen from a much longer historical perspective, these dictators are playing a very weak hand. They will lose.